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The Syrian conflict started in March 2011 with a few popular 
demonstrations and swiftly escalated into a civil war involving 
international actors. Of the approximately 22 million Syrians 
recorded in the country on the eve of the war,1 as of November 
2015, perhaps a quarter of a million have been killed;2 7.6 million 
were internally displaced;3 and an estimated 5.6 million left the 
country. Of these, the great majority (4.3 million, or 76 percent of 
all refugees) moved to the countries neighbouring Syria: Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, as well as, in lesser numbers, to Egypt. 
Syrians who present themselves to UNHCR in Jordan are 
automatically recognized as prima facie refugees by the Agency: they 
are not required to undergo a refugee status determination process 
and are thus afforded protection and access to subsidized primary 
health care and other essential services. Similarly, in October 2011 
the Turkish authorities declared that a temporary protection regime 
would take effect for all Syrians and Palestinians from Syria. 
However, receiving countries’ policies towards Syrian refugees have 
changed over the last four years. Syrians were originally welcome. 
But security concerns quickly mounted, and refugees came to 
be considered a burden on the already overstretched services-
providing capacities in the five neighbouring countries. Restrictions 
on the entry of Syrian refugees were rapidly implemented. A report 
by Amnesty International stated that, “since mid-2012, Turkey 
has blocked thousands of individuals fleeing Syria from entering 
Turkey, especially those without a passport or an urgent medical 
need, leaving many displaced on the Syrian side of the border.” 
Border crossing points were also reduced. In Jordan, limitations 
were put in place in 2013. These led to a drop in incoming refugees, 
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from an average of 60,000 at the start of the year 
to just 10,000 in September. Authorities justified 
the policy by fears for security and the infiltration 
of activists seeking to destabilise the Kingdom. 
However, certain categories of refugees have 
especially been targeted: unaccompanied men who 
cannot prove that they have family ties in Jordan; 
and people without identity documentation; not 
to mention Palestinian refugees from Syria and 
Iraqi refugees living in Syria.4 Only two border-
crossing points remain open between the two 
countries, and the Jordanian authorities claim 
that 50 to 100 persons a day cross over to Jordan. 
However, as of late 2015, 12,000 to 15,000 Syrians 
were said to remain stranded at the border.5 Iraqi 
borders open and close intermittently. In Lebanon, 
Palestinian refugees from Syria were also targeted 
by deportations following a change of policy in May 
2014.6 In October 2014, the government finally 
announced that it would limit entries of Syrians 
to “extreme humanitarian cases.” Since then, 
Lebanon has turned away as many as 60 percent of 
people attempting to cross the border, according 
to the Red Cross.7 Moreover, Syrian refugees are 
prohibited from re-entering the country if they go 
back for a visit, one of the several new entry and 
exit regulations applied since 2014.8 In May 2015, 
the Lebanese government instructed UNHCR to 
suspend the registration of Syrian refugees in the 
country.9
Refugees already residing in these five countries 
were also targeted by discriminatory measures. 
Some deportations from Egypt took place after 
July 2013 and the ousting of President Morsi.10 In 
Jordan, the ‘bail out’ policy requirement forbids 
free movement into and out of the camps, where 
urban refugees have increasingly been placed since 
2014. Police measures were undertaken such as the 
verification campaign conducted in February 2015, 
which aimed at biometrically registering Syrian 
refugees living in urban areas in order to reissue 
cards granting access to basic services. Services 
available to Syrian refugees have been restricted. 
For instance, the government cancelled free access 
to healthcare centres for registered Syrians living 
in host communities in November 2014, claiming 
an overburdened health sector and a stretched 
budget.11 In Lebanon, Syrians who are registered 
with the UNHCR can now prolong their legal stay 
in Lebanon for a year, but only if they pledge not 
to work. Non-refugee Syrians require a Lebanese 
sponsor if they want to remain in the country. The 
costs of renewing residency is also an obstacle, as it 
can reach up to $600.12 This compels many families 
to become irregular. Families drop into poverty 
as they lose their savings:  it is impossible to work 
legally in Jordan and Lebanon, competition drives 
wages down in Turkey, and living expenses are 
rising. Lastly, as of September 2015, the World Food 
Program (WFP) had to drop one third of Syrian 
refugees from its food voucher program in Middle 
Eastern host countries, including 229,000 in Jordan. 
Access to education for children also became more 
difficult in every host state.
Meanwhile, war spread over the whole of Syria. 
No region is now fully safe. Moreover, the World 
Bank indicates that “public and private assets 
including health, education, energy, water and 
sanitation, agriculture, transportation, housing and 
infrastructure” were destroyed, leading to a lack of 
health care and education, to poor food availability 
and even to nutritional deprivation.13 Such a 
situation prevents refugees from returning to Syria.
Why have Syrians gone to Europe in such large 
numbers since spring 2015? Reasons include: the 
continuous emigration pressures from Syria and 
the impossibility of returning; the total or partial 
closure of the neighbouring countries’ borders to 
new refugees; as well as the deterioration in socio-
economic conditions faced by refugees inside host 
countries.14
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Amid Europe’s “migration crisis,” the flow of 
refugees from Syria registered in the whole region 
crossed the half-million threshold in the month 
of August 2015. After initially resisting the inflow, 
Germany, the prime destination for migrants, 
decided on August 25 to suspend the Dublin 
Regulation for Syrian refugees and to process their 
asylum applications directly.15 Early September 
2015, relocation quotas for all European countries 
were discussed, to alleviate the burden on countries 
of first arrival in southern Europe, where migrants 
were stranded, including Italy and Greece, as 
well as some Balkan countries. Syrian nationals 
are considered prima facie refugees. As of 24 
November 2015, the confirmed pledges to resettle 
Syrian refugees recorded by UNHCR had reached 
160,664.16 Ahead of a large-scale resettlement of 
200,000 Syrian migrants distributed across Europe 
from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, especially from 
refugee camps,17 Canada and the United States have 
both committed to increasing the number of Syrian 
refugees they will accept given the global migration 
crisis. The US has pledged to accept 10,000 refugees 
in 2016, while Canada has said it will welcome 
25,000,18 including some from first migration 
Middle Eastern countries, especially Jordan and 
Lebanon. A number of EU countries do not have a 
specific resettlement programme for refugees. The 
policy of private sponsorship in force in Canada 
since 1979, whereby individual Canadians can 
finance the resettlement of specific refugees, provide 
practical and emotional support is now raising 
interest among policy-makers.19 Such schemes 
exist in Germany, where most federal states allow 
private citizens to sponsor Syrian refugees. The 
UK announced recently that it plans to introduce 
a private sponsorship programme along the lines of 
Canada’s.20
Europe is also trying to stem the flow of refugee. 
Alongside donor agencies, it is advocating increased 
aid to these countries of first asylum.21 In this 
process, Turkey is of major political importance. 
The country is indeed the point of departure for 
the East Mediterranean migration maritime route, 
the main avenue to Europe through the Balkans,22 
and was accused of having “turned a blind eye to 
refugee smugglers.”23 An EU-Turkey summit took 
place in Brussels on 29 November. In exchange for a 
Turkish promise to act against migrant trafficking,24 
the EU agreed to pay € 3 billion for refugees living 
in Turkey, to enact visa liberation measures and 
committed to “re-energizing” the long-stalled 
enlargement process.25 It is worth noting that these 
two provisions and their conditionality on the 
management of irregular migration by Turkey were 
already addressed in the Readmission Agreement 
signed between the EU and Turkey in December 
2013,26 alongside the Roadmap Towards A Visa-
Free Regime With Turkey,27 which initiated the EU-
Turkey Visa liberalization dialogue.
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Outward migration
Stocks
Stocks 
As of November 2015, the total numbers of Syrian 
nationals abroad stand at about 7.3 million, of 
whom 5.6 million left the country since 2011 
(Table 1). Before the war, most Syrians used to 
migrate to the Gulf States, around half a million in 
Saudi Arabia alone.28 Since 2011, some 4.3 million 
refugees have fled to neighbouring countries now 
hosting 76 percent of all refugees and 68 percent 
of all Syrians abroad: Turkey (39 percent of all 
refugees), Lebanon (19 percent) and Jordan (11.3 
percent), as well as Egypt and Iraq.29 As a point of 
comparison, Europe received more than 700,000 
Syrian refugees (468,470 in the EU-28) since 
2011, a few thousands have reached Canada and 
the US, and around 21,000 have found sanctuary 
everywhere in the world.30 
Transnational networks played a role: some Syrians 
joined members of the Syro-Lebanese diaspora in 
South America for instance, while some of Syria’s 
ethnic minorities such as the Armenians and 
Tcherkess, found outlet refuge in their ancestors’ 
Caucasian countries.31 Migration to the Gulf States 
since 2011 is much harder to estimate due to lack 
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of data. For this reason, claims by Saudi Arabia 
that the Kingdom received 2.5 million Syrians 
since the start of the war, for instance, cannot 
be verified. The estimate proposed in Table 1 is 
a minimal estimate, only partially assessable.32 
None of these six countries are signatories to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol and, thus, do not recognize 
“refugees” as a legal category. Expatriates in the 
region are considered “guests” on short-duration 
visit visas, or temporary contract workers (of whom 
only a fraction have a right to family reunion). 
Moreover, security concerns and the Gulf regimes’ 
fears for the import of political sedition prevented 
sizeable numbers of Syrians from seeking refuge 
in these countries. Since the start of the Syrian 
conflict, besides offering selective opportunities 
for attracting highly-skilled Syrian professionals to 
their countries, the Gulf States claimed that they 
facilitated family reunion. This supports the idea 
that previous migration networks were used by 
Syrian refugees, to a certain extent. 
Prior to the current conflict, Syria was hosting 
significant numbers of refugees and asylum-
seekers. The large majority originated from 
Palestine (526,744 were registered with UNRWA 
as of January 2011, most of them descendants of 
refugees who arrived in successive waves since 
1948)33 and from Iraq. These had escaped the civil 
war and sectarian strife in their country, which has 
been ongoing since 2003. About 1.5 million Iraqis 
are said to have transited through Syria between 
2003 and 2011, while about 500,000 (about 150,000 
of whom registered as refugees by UNHCR)34  were 
thought to be residing in Syria as of early 2011.35 
There were also smaller numbers of refuges and 
asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia 
and other countries, as well as some 75,000 to 
100,000 foreign domestic workers, mostly from 
South and South East Asian countries.36 Since 2011, 
and the deepening of the conflict, many Iraqis 
have headed back to Iraq, in spite of persisting 
insecurity there. As of mid-2015, UNHCR was 
still assisting 23,500 Iraqi refugees in Syria.37 As 
regards Palestinian refugees, UNRWA estimates 
that 450,000 are still in Syria, of whom as many as 
280,000 are displaced within the country. A further 
80,000 are in neighbouring countries: Lebanon 
(42,500 Palestinian Refugees from Syria, or PRS 
recorded), Jordan (16,000 PRS recorded), Turkey, 
Egypt, as well as Europe.38 
With the exception of Egypt and Iraq where they 
are less numerous,39  most Syrian refugees migrated 
as families to neighbouring countries. In Jordan 
for instance, 52 percent are below the age of 17, 
with a balanced sex ratio in the refugee population 
as a whole.40 Most refugees fled to points abroad 
close to their region of residence in Syria in the 
hope that they could return rapidly to their homes 
once the conflict ended. In Iraq, for instance, 
Syrian refugees are mainly from the governorates 
of Hassake in North-East Syria (58 percent) and 
Aleppo (25 percent) and almost all of them (97 
percent) reside in the three governorates of the 
Kurdish Autonomous Region of Northern Iraq 
(KR-I): namely Erbil, Suleimaniah and Duhok.41 In 
Jordan similarly, refugees settled in the North and 
East of the country. Those from the governorate of 
Deraa in the South of Syria formed the majority (45 
percent) of all Syrian refugees in September 2015. 
However, they were only 68 percent of  registered 
refugees from two years before in 2013, a sign of 
the expansion of the conflict and of displacements 
since then.42 
In Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, camps were set up to 
accommodate the refugees. They host 20 percent 
of Syrian refugees in the first two countries and 38 
percent in Iraqi Kurdistan. The largest of Jordan’s six 
camps (Za’atari Camp) hosted as many as 130,000 
persons in early 2014 (80,000 as of today).43  In Iraq, 
Domiz-1 camp in the Duhok region accommodates 
some  41,000 persons. The remaining 62 percent 
of refugees live in urban areas among local 
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communities.44 In Lebanon and in Egypt, refugees 
settled within local communities. Harsh living 
conditions in refugee camps were widely publicised, 
but registration and services delivery to scattered 
refugees proved a huge challenge too. As indicated 
by relief agencies, refugees outside camps are 
becoming more vulnerable than their counterparts 
inside camps,45 as refugee savings are progressively 
depleted and family assistance is strained.46 
Twelve percent of Syrian refugees are now in 
Europe. Most of them are registered in Germany 
and Sweden, two of their favoured destinations, 
as well as in Hungary (71,600) and Serbia-Kosovo 
(205,568) as of 1 November 2015. However, 
refugees who completed registration in the latter 
two countries most often settle elsewhere in 
Europe.47
Flows
The outflow of refugees to Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey started immediately after March 2011. 
Assuming they would soon be returning to their 
homes, refugees initially fled to regions close to their 
original locations. In this way they could commute 
across the border, check on relatives and family 
assets, etc. Pre-conflict cross-border mobility, 
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intermarriages, business relations also provided 
short-term assistance and accommodations at 
the beginning. The cumulative refugee figures 
registered since December 2011 highlights the rapid 
pace of exits from Syria to neighbouring countries, 
especially in 2013 to Jordan, and until mid-2014 to 
Lebanon, where Syrians currently make up about 
a quarter of the country’s resident population. As 
fighting and insecurity have intensified everywhere, 
the outflow of refugees continued unabated, but 
2013 witnessed a significant hike in exits with 1.8 
million newly registered refugees in neighbouring 
countries that year, twice the figure of registrations 
for 2014, for instance. This drop in figures indicates 
the progressive exhaustion of private and receiving 
states’ solidarity.
Since late 2014, the number of refugees has tended 
to decrease everywhere save in Turkey. In Lebanon, 
the decreasing figures probably reflects the 
channelling of growing numbers into irregularity 
due to stricter policies enacted since mid-2014, as 
explained in introduction. 
The true numbers of refugees may not be going 
down. A hike in the number of registered persons 
is particularly noticeable between October and 
December 2014 in Turkey. This period witnessed 
intense battles between ISIS and local and 
international fighters, in Kobane on the Turkish 
border, and in the Raqqa region, which spurred 
massive displacements of Syrian Kurds and Arabs.
A comparison between the evolution of registered 
refugees in the Middle East and asylum seekers 
in Europe since December 2011 emphasizes the 
gap between numbers in the two regions. It also 
illustrates the fact that migration to Europe only 
really took off in late 2014. Borders and labour 
markets of neighbouring countries had been closed 
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to Syrians, and hopes for the rapid settlement of 
the conflict had faded. Refugees to Europe are, 
therefore, a new wave of migrants. 
A survey conducted by UNHCR of 1,245 Syrian 
refugees who arrived in Greece between April and 
September 2015 provided interesting results here. 
The majority (63 percent) were first migrants, 
having fled directly from Syria during 2015 and 
only transited through a third country before 
migrating to Europe.  Over 62 percent originated 
from Damascus and Aleppo. The largest groups 
were students and working professionals, including 
teachers, lawyers, doctors, bakers, designers, 
hairdressers and IT specialists. Forty-three 
percent of the interviewees had a university level 
education, and another 43 percent had secondary 
level education. Half of them were single with no 
children, and 58 percent were planning to bring 
their family over to Europe once settled.48  However, 
the EU Family Reunification Directive limits family 
reunification to spouses and minor children, and 
does not permit reunion with parents and siblings. 
Therefore, these too are compelled to undertake 
the risky sea journey to Europe, from Egyptian or 
from Turkish shores.
Once in Europe, Syrian asylum seekers turned 
mainly to Sweden and to Germany: their numbers 
went up from, respectively, 25,090 to 93,690 and 
from 20,680 to 162,565 between December 2013 
and October 2015, a four- and an eightfold increase 
over the previous twenty-three months. Moreover, 
the dramatic increases in asylum seekers in the 
Balkans (for example the numbers for Serbia have 
gone from 1,650 to 205,568), likely represents 
Syrians who in fact have reached Germany. As of 
October 2015, Germany alone hosted 23 percent of 
Syrian asylum seekers in the whole of Europe, and 
35 percent of those in the EU-28.
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exceptionally become formal asylum claims in 
Serbia and Kosovo” (ECRE, internal note to the 
MPC). See http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
migrant-crisis/migrant-crisis-refugees/ [Accessed 2 
February 2016].
48.  See http://www.unhcr.org/5666c8de6.html 
[Accessed 2 February 2016].
Content © Authors, 2016
© European University Institute, 2016
Migration Policy Centre 
The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research 
on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, imple-
menting and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy 
and society. The Migration Policy Centre is co-financed by the European Union.
Migration Policy Centre - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European University 
Institute - Via Boccaccio 151 I-50133 Florence Italy.
 
Tel: (+39) 055 4685 817
Fax: (+39) 055 4685 770
mpc@eui.eu
More information about our activities can be found at: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
Q
M
-A
P-
16
-0
02
-E
N
-N
doi:10.2870/447581
ISSN 2363-3441
ISBN 978-92-9084-392-4
